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The General Account of 
Pleasure in Plato's Philebus 
T H O M A S  M. T U O Z Z O  
1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
DOES PLATO IN THE Philebus presen t  a single genera l  a c c o u n t  o f  p leasure ,  
appl icable  to all o f  the  kinds o f  p leasure  he  discusses in tha t  d ia logue?  Gosl ing  
a n d  T a y l o r  th ink  n o t ; '  D o r o t h e a  F r e d e  has recent ly  reasser ted  a vers ion o f  the  
con t r a ry ,  t rad i t iona l  view. 2 T h e  t radi t ional  view, I shall a r g u e  in this essay, is 
cor rec t :  the  Philebus does  conta in  a genera l  accoun t  o f  p leasure  appl icable  to 
all p leasures .  Nonethe less ,  Gos l ing  and  T a y l o r  have po in ted  to a real  diff iculty 
with the  t rad i t iona l  view, a difficulty tha t  has neve r  been  adequa te ly  ad-  
dressed .  T o  show how it can  be  o v e r c o m e  will involve showing  that  Plato's 
a c c o u n t  o f  p leasure ,  a n d  his analyses o f  o t h e r  p h e n o m e n a  o f  m o r a l  psychol-  
ogy  in the  Philebus, a re  m o r e  c o m p l e x  and  subtle t han  has o f t en  b e e n  real ized.  
Gos l ing  a n d  T a y l o r  o f f e r  two cons idera t ions  in s u p p o r t  o f  their  view: (1) 
Socrates  insists aga ins t  P r o t a r c h u s  tha t  d i f f e ren t  p leasures  can be "mos t  o p p o -  
site" to each  o the r ,  which  suggests  tha t  no  single a ccoun t  can app ly  to t h e m  
all,s a n d  (2) Socrates  does  no t  indicate  how the  mos t  likely cand ida t e  fo r  a 
gene ra l  a c c o u n t  o f  p leasure ,  one  involving the  res to ra t ion  o f  a na tu ra l  har -  
,j. c. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford, 1982), 14o: "It seems 
clear that in the Philebus Plato has no general formula to encapsulate the nature of pleasure . . . .  " 
So, too, C. Hampton, Pleasure, Knowledge and Being: An Analysis of Plato's "Philebus" (Albany, 199o), 
73. A similar view is implied by H. Voigtl~inder, Die Lust und das Gute bei Platon (Wfirzburg, 196o), 
163 n. 99- 
2 D. Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in the Philebus," in The Cam- 
bridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut (Cambridge, ] 992), 444: "Plato's definition of pleasure... 
is designed to cover all kinds of pleasure . . . .  " Cf. also D. Frede, tr., Plato: Philebus (Indianapolis, 
1993), xliii: "The definition of pleasure and pain as restoration and disintegration..." Important 
older representatives of the traditional view are F. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwicklung der 
Platonischen Philosophie (2 vols., 1885-186o; reprint, Osnabriick, 1967), 2 :1-58 and J. Ferber, 
"Piatos Polemik gegen die Lusflehre," Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik 148 (1912): 
129--81. 
3 Gosling and Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, 136, 14 o. 
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m o n y ,  c o u l d  poss ib ly  a p p l y  to  two i m p o r t a n t  types  o f  p l e a s u r e  he  d iscusses :  
p l e a s u r e s  o f  a n t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  w h a t  we m a y  call  t he  " e m o t i o n a l "  p l e a s u r e s ,  such  
as t h o s e  i n v o l v e d  in ma l i c ious  l augh te r .4  T h e  first  o f  t he se  c a n n o t  be  m a d e  to 
c a r r y  m u c h  weigh t .  Soc ra t e s  c o m p a r e s  t he  d i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  p l e a s u r e s  wi th  
t h o s e  a m o n g  co lo r s  a n d  those  a m o n g  shapes ;  in e a c h o f  t hese  cases  t he  d i f f e r -  
i n g  i t ems  a r e  " o n e  in k i n d  [ g e n e i . . .  hen]" whi le  a d m i t t i n g  " t e n - t h o u s a n d - f o l d  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , "  such  t ha t  s o m e  o f  t h e m  a r e  " m o s t  o p p o s i t e  to each  o t h e r "  
( 12e 7 - 1 3 a 2 ) .  E v e n  in the  M e n o  Socra t e s  r e c o g n i z e s - - i n d e e d ,  i n s i s t s w t h a t  d i f -  
f e r e n t  s h a p e s  a n d  co lo r s  m a y  be  " o p p o s i t e  to each  o t h e r "  (74d7) ,  even  as he  
p r e s se s  M e n o  f o r  de f in i t i ons  t ha t  a p p l y  to all shapes  o r  colors ,  respect ive ly .5  
His  ins i s t ence  in t h e  Philebus o n  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  types  o f  p l e a s u r e  d o e s  
n o t  i m p l y ,  ~ n o r  e v e n  sugges t ,  t ha t  l o o k i n g  fo r  a s ingle  a c c o u n t  o f  t he  genos o f  
p l e a s u r e  is a mis take .7  
G o s l i n g  a n d  T a y l o r ' s  s e c o n d  r e a s o n  fo r  d e n y i n g  the  ex i s t ence  o f  a g e n e r i c  
a c c o u n t  o f  p l e a s u r e  in t he  Philebus is m o r e  se r ious ,  h o w e v e r .  Socra tes  d o e s  n o t  
exp l i c i t l y  show h o w  e i t h e r  p l e a s u r e s  o f  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o r  e m o t i o n a l  p l e a s u r e s  can  
be  e x p l a i n e d  by  a r e s t o r a t i o n - m o d e l  o f  p l e a s u r e ,  s N o n e t h e l e s s ,  I shal l  a r g u e  
4 Gosling and Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, 136. Gosling and Taylor are also skeptical of the 
applicability of such an account to the pure pleasures of sight and sound 038). In this, and in 
their skepticism about explaining pleasures of anticipation on the restorative model, Gosling and 
Taylor take up an Aristotelian criticism: "The pleasures of learning, and, among the sensuous 
pleasures, those of smell, and also many sounds and sights, and memories and hopes, do not 
involve pain. Of what will these be the coming into being? There has not been a lack of anything 
of which they could be the replenishment" (EN t 173 b 16-2o, tr. Ross modified). 
5 This point is made by Dybikowski in his review of Gosling's edition of the Philebus, in Mind 
86 0977): 446-48. 
6Dybikowski, in his review, insists that pleasures qua pleasure are the same; Gosling and 
Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, 134 insist that to say so is to side with Protarchus against Socrates 
(see a 3c5), which Plato cannot have wanted us to do. I suspect that an ambiguity in the expression 
"pleasures qua pleasure" underlies this dispute. Generically pleasures do not differ qua pleasure, 
but specifically they do. The same is true of the species of any genus, and of the determinates of 
any determinable. Cat and mouse are the same qua (generic) animal, but different qua (specific) 
animal. Red and blue are both colors, but differ qua (determinate) color. (Plato does not seem to 
have distinguished the genus/species relation from the determinable/determinate relation; see E. 
Benitez, Forms in Plato's "Philebus" [Assen, 1989], 49-51.) 
7 Gosling and Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, 135-36, suggest that one of the beneficial results 
of the rejection of a single account of pleasure is that it then becomes difficult to use pleasantness 
as a criterion of a good life. As they realize, a generic account of pleasure need not in itself 
provide a criterion for determining the relative pleasantness of pleasures. In the Meno Socrates 
insists both that there is a generic account of color (and shape) and that no color (or shape) is more 
of a color (or shape) than any other (74clo-e9). 
s Most defenders of the view that Plato has a single account to cover all the different kinds of 
pleasure do not consider how a restoration-model of pleasure could apply to anticipatory or 
emotional pleasure. Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration," does argue that "Plato's definition 
of pleasure as a perceived filling or restoration" (444) applies to such pleasures. To do so she must 
broaden the notion of lack or disruption and loosen it from any connection with natural harmony. 
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that the dialogue contains clear indications as to how the restoration-model 
may be extended to apply to these pleasures. First, however, it will be neces- 
sary to get clear on just  what the account of  pleasure as involving restoration 
consists in. Plato has Socrates develop such an account in three important 
passages, strategically placed at the beginning (31 d 1-3~b4), middle (43b l-c7), 
and end (53c4-55al l) of  the discussion of  pleasure (31b4 to 55c0.  The differ- 
ences between these passages are due, I shall argue, to their different con- 
text~; the essential account they give of  the nature of  pleasure is the same. As I 
argue in section ~, according to that account pleasure is a conscious psychic 
process produced by the restoration of  a natural harmony, whether of  body or 
of  soul. (Such pleasure is a mere sensation, a psychic epiphenomenon of  the 
restoration that causes it, and has no intentional object.9) This account directly 
applies, however, only to a class of  pleasures that I shall call "unreflective," 
and n o t  to "reflective" pleasures, of  which both anticipatory and emotional 
pleasures are examples. An examination of  Socrates' and Protarchus' discus- 
sion of  these two kinds of  pleasure in sections 3 and 4 will lead to an account of  
reflective pleasures as conscious psychic processes caused by entertaining men- 
tal representations or images of  oneself in conditions that (one thinks) cause 
pleasure. (These pleasures, too, are psychic epiphenomena, this time of  cer- 
tain cognitive activities; the pleasurable epiphenomena themselves have no 
intentional objects.) Putting these two accounts together, we may arrive at a 
comprehensive account of  pleasure as a conscious psychic process caused 
either by the reality of  the restoration of  a bodily or psychic harmony, or by 
entertaining the image of  such a restoration.~~ This causal account of  plea- 
sure, in spite of  the disjunction it contains, is nonetheless a genuinely unified 
account. For the two different causes it mentions are not unrelated, but are 
Thus she writes: "[Plato's] definition of p l ea su re . . .  [is] the [perceived] filling of a lack . . . .  Plato 
treats anything that we do not 'have' as a lack" (453). Among older writers, Susemihl, D/e genetische 
Entwickelung, makes the best effort to extend the restoration model to anticipatory pleasures. He 
writes: "Wir m i i s s e n . . .  Lust und Unlust im Allgemeinen also als die Vorstellung des Ange- 
nehmen und Unangenehmen in Bezug auf  alle drei Zeiten, d.h., als den Gegenlauf yon Absorp- 
tion und  Reproduction selber, so weit er in die Vorstellung tritt, bezeichnen" (9: 33). But there is 
an ambiguity in Susemihl's use of Vorstellung, which seems to refer, in the case of present plea- 
sures / pains, to mere perception or awareness, and, in the case of anticipations, to mental 
representations. The  latter, I shall argue, are not pleasures, but may cause pleasure. 
0 Frede, Plato: Philebus, xliv, suggests that all pleasures have an "intentional object," but allows 
that "immediate physical pleasures do not presuppose a propositional content" (xlvii, n. 9). Nei- 
ther, on my view, do immediate or unreflective psychic pleasures. Furthermore,  even reflective 
pleasures only presuppose propositional content insofar as their cause has such content. 
~oJ.-L. Cherlonneix, "La 'v~ritC du plaisir ou le probl~me de la biologie platonicienne," Revue 
de M~taphysique et de Morale 91 (1986): 311-38 , suggests a similar account: "Risquons tout de 
meme que le plaisir, pour  Platon, c'est la sensation ~veilMe en l'ame du vivant mortel soit imm6di- 
atement par  un  proc~s de r~int~gration, de cette hme elle-m~me ou du corps qu'elle vivifie, soit 
par  la representation de ce qui pourrait  r~int~grer I'hme ou le corps" (317). 
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r a the r  re lated as original to image,  and  it is precisely in vir tue o f  its relation to 
an original  res tora t ion that  the image shares the original 's  power  to cause 
pleasure.  
Nei ther  the account  o f  reflective p leasure  I shall give, no r  the generic  
account  o f  p leasure  to which it contributes,  is given expressis verbis in the 
Philebus. T h e y  may  the re fo re  be unconvincing to those who consider  the dia- 
logue a s t ra igh t forward  presenta t ion  o f  Plato's thinking on the topics it treats. 
(Considered  f r o m  such a point  o f  view, however,  the Philebus makes  a r a the r  
poo r  showing.) I think that  a good case can be made,  however ,  for  the view 
that  Plato des igned even his la ter  dialogues so as to p rovoke  reflection on  the 
p rob lems  they treat,  and  fur ther ,  that  these dialogues contain indications o f  
the solutions to which Plato expec ted  such reflection initially to lead. I shall 
not  a rgue  in genera l  t e rms  for  this methodological  p o i n t ; "  it will be indirectly 
s u p p o r t e d  to the ex ten t  that the app r oach  taken here  proves  frui t ful  in inter- 
p re t ing  this notor iously  obscure  dialogue.  
2. THE GENERAL ACCOUNT OF (NONREFLECTIVE) PLEASURE 
T h e  first o f  the  three  passages in which Socrates and  Protarchus  work out  a 
genera l  account  o f  p leasure  begins as follows: 
Soc.: Now pay as much attention as you can. 
Prot.: Go on. 
Soc.: I say, then, that when that harmony ~ of ours is being relaxed, in living beings 
there occur together at that time a relaxation of their nature and a generation of pains. 
Prot.: What you say is quite likely. 
Soc.: And when [that nature] is being restored to harmony and is returning to its 
own nature, we must say that pleasure occurs, if it is necessary that our statement about 
the greatest matters should be made as quickly as possible in a few words. (3 ld1-1o) 
Socrates '  in t roduct ion  to this passage, and  especially his words at its end,  
emphas ize  the impor t ance  o f  what  is he re  said. Socrates offers  in this passage 
a res to ra t ion-mode l  o f  pleasure,  and  two points about  his presenta t ion  o f  it 
need  to be made .  (I)  Noth ing  in the passage indicates that  Socrates means  to 
restrict the account  conta ined in it to bodily pleasures; '3 for  all that  is said 
here ,  it may  app ly  to psychic ones  as well. (2) Socrates does  not  he re  identify 
" For similar views of the later dialogues, see M. H. Miller, Jr., The Philosopher in Plato's 
"Statesman" (The Hague, 198o), ix-xix, and K. Sayre, "A Maieutic View of Five Late Dialogues," 
inJ. C. Klagge and N. D. Smith, eds., Methods of lnterpreting Plato and His Dialogues, Oxford Studies 
in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume (1992), 221-43. 
~2 There is no textual warrant for adding "physical" before "harmony," as do the translations 
ofJ. C. B. Gosling (Plato: Philebus [Oxford, 1975] ) and R. Waterfield (Plato: Philebus [New York, 
1982]). 
~5 The notion that Socrates is concerned only with bodily pleasures in this passage is as old as 
Damascius, Lectures on the Philebus, ed. Westerink (~nd printing: Amsterdam, 198z), w 14 i. 
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pain with relaxation of  a natural harmony, nor pleasure with restoration of  
such a harmony. He indicates that there is some relation between them, but 
leaves the relation as vague as possible: the processes of  relaxation and restora- 
tion are referred to by means of  genitive absolutes. The one thing that seems 
clear is that the relation is not identity.t4 Socrates' last words indicate that he 
realizes that his succinct account leaves out something of  importance; this 
includes, at least, an account of  the relation between pleasure / pain and the 
processes of  restoration / relaxation of  harmony. 
What has led interpreters generally to overlook these two points is Socra- 
tes' evident neglect of  them in the ensuing passage. For the examples he uses 
to illustrate this account of  pain and pleasure are all bodily experiences 
(hunger-eating, thirst-drinking, shivering-warming up, being stiflingly hot- 
cooling down), and in his recapitulation of  the account of  pleasure after his 
discussion of these examples he does not scruple to identify pain with the 
relaxation or destruction of  a natural harmony and pleasure with the process 
of  its restoration: 
A n d  in a s ingle  s t a t e m e n t - - s e e  i f  t ha t  s t a t e m e n t  seems w e l l - m e a s u r e d  to you  w h i c h  
says t ha t  the  f o r m  c o m p o s e d  o f  t he  inde f in i t e  a n d  o f  limit, wh ich  is na tu ra l ,  en sou l ed ,  
and generated, which I talked about earlier--whenever that form is perishing, the 
perishing is pain [t~n... phthoran lup~n einai], but the path into their own being, this 
return, on the other hand, is, again, in the case of all things, pleasure. (32a8-b4) 
This identification, after the careful avoidance of  the identification in the 
initial statement of  the theory, is not a case of  Plato nodding. It is explicable in 
terms of  the interaction between the interlocutors, which is important even in 
this late dialogue. Socrates' interlocutor is Protarchus, whose name indicates 
that he is a beginner twice-over.'5 After Socrates' initial exposition of  the 
nature of  pleasure, Protarchus responds: "While I think you are speaking 
correctly, Socrates, let us try to say the same things even more clearly" (3 l e ~- 
~). Socrates takes the opportunity to explain more clearly what he means by 
the restoration of  natural harmony, using "run-of-the-mill and extremely obvi- 
ous" examples, which are "easiest to understand" (e3-4). In order to simplify 
,4 So too Ferber, "Platos Polemik," 163, n.3: "Plato driickt sich meist ungenau a u s . . .  ; doch 
lassen die Worte h a m a . . ,  tn t6i tote chronOi. . ,  den Unterschied zwischen beiden Vorglingen 
deuflich erkennen_" 
,5 A. DiEs, Phil~be (Paris, 1966), liv, calls Protarchus "un jeune dialecticien," and Susemihl, D/e 
genaische Entu~kelung,  5, compares him to Theaetetus. Perhaps surprisingly, no one has, to my 
knowledge, hi therto made the simple point about the meaning of Protarchus' name. (This point 
does not depend  oft the fictionality or historicity of Protarchus, son ofCallias.) R. Hackforth, Plato's 
Philebus (Cambridge, t945, repr. t972 ), 7, expresses the more common view that Protarchus is "just 
the 'ordinary listener', the average educated interlocutor needed to keep up some semblance of real 
discussion." 
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matters, Socrates for the time being treats this restoration as identical to plea- 
sure; but this is a simplification he soon corrects. 
The "extremely obvious" examples adduced by Socrates of  harmony dis- 
rupted and restored are all bodily ones. After concluding his discussion of  
them with the "single statement" concerning the nature of  pleasure quoted 
above, Socrates introduces a "second type of  pleasure and pain," belonging to 
"the soul alone" (32b6-c5). We shall discuss these pleasures in greater detail 
later; what is important for our present purposes is that after having intro- 
duced this type of  pleasure, Socrates once more recapitulates the general 
account of  pleasure as involving restoration, this time, as at first, leaving vague 
the precise relation between pleasure and restoration. 16 That he does so indi- 
cates that he holds that some version of  the general account applies to psychic 
pleasure, too. He does not, however, explicitly explain how it does so. 
The psychic pleasures Socrates introduces at 32b6-9 are the pleasures of  
anticipation. In investigating these pleasures, Socrates finds it necessary first 
to give an analysis of  perception, in the course of  which it becomes obvious 
that the initial account of  pleasure needs to be supplemented if it is going to 
apply even to the simplest case of  the pleasure of  bodily restoration. In 
analyzing perception Socrates distinguishes between bodily processes that are 
"extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the latter 
unaffected" and those that "proceed through both and produce in them 
something like a shock, both peculiar and common to each of  them" (33d3- 
6). This distinction once made, it would be easy to make the change in the 
preliminary account of  pleasure that would render it adequate to the plea- 
sures of  bodily restoration. Socrates could easily have proceeded: restoration 
of  a bodily harmony is a bodily process; when it is "extinguished in the body 
before it reaches the soul," there is no pleasure, whereas when it produces "a 
peculiar shock, common to body and soul," that shock constitutes a pleasure. 
But Socrates does not immediately revise his account of  pleasure; rather, 
Plato has him first finish his analysis of  pleasures of  anticipation, thus posi- 
tioning the revised account of  pleasure strategically at the center of  the 
discussion of  pleasure. What is more, when Socrates does revise the account 
of  pleasure, he does not do so in the way that the treatment of  perception 
leads us to expect. Doing so would have made the revised account apply only 
to bodily pleasures; the revision Socrates in fact produces is applicable to 
psychic pleasures as well. 
The revision of  the preliminary account of  pleasure takes place after the 
,6,,if what we have said really is the case: when these things are being destroyed, there is pain, 
and when they are being restored, pleasure..." (32d9-e2). Again, Socrates uses that vaguest of 
constructions, the genitive absolute. 
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discussion of  anticipatory pleasures is concluded. Socrates introduces his revi- 
sion with a recapitulation o f  the preliminary account of  pleasure: 
Soc.: I suppose it has often been said that, when the nature of each of these things is 
severally being corrupted [t~s phuse6s hekast6n diaphtheiromcr~s] by joinings and separa- 
tions and fillings and emptyings and certain growings and shrinkings, pains and aches 
and agonies and everything with a name like that happen to occur. 
Prot.: Yes, that has often been said. 
Soc.: And when there is taking place an establishment [kathist~ta2]w into their own 
nature, this establishment, on the other hand, we have accepted from ourselves to be 
pleasure. 
Prot.: And righdy so. (42c9-d8) 
This recapitulation also recapitulates the ambiguity we noticed above about 
the relation of  pleasure and pain to the processes of  destruction and restora- 
tion. Socrates at first leaves the relation between pain and the process o f  
"corruption" vague, using, once again, a genitive absolute construction. He 
then proceeds straightforwardly to identify pleasure with the process o f  (re)es- 
tablishing the relevant natural  condition. This oscillation f rom vagueness to 
outr ight  identification highlights the ambiguity left hanging by the earlier 
discussion. Fur thermore ,  Socrates' statement that "we have accepted f rom 
ourselves" the identification of  pleasure with the relevant process may suggest 
that the identification was made in the first place because o f  Socrates' need to 
proceed slowly with this particular interlocutor. Socrates is now in a position to 
revoke that  identification and specify the relation between process and plea- 
sure as a causal one?  s 
To  call into question the identification that Protarchus still thinks was 
"rightly" made,  Socrates once again makes reference, first of  all, to the "obvi- 
ous" pleasures and  pains, those o f  the body.~9 But the criticism leveled at the 
identification is couched in terms that make it equally applicable to purely 
psychic pleasures and  pains: 
Soc.: Answer me this: concerning all the things that any animate thing undergoes 
[pasche~]--does the thing undergoing them always perceive all of them, and do we 
neither grow, nor undergo any other such thing unawares; or is it quite the reverse? 
Prot.: Quite the reverse indeed; nearly all such things escape our notice. (43bl-6) 
Al though growth is most likely here a bodily process, the distinction between 
processes and our  (affective) awareness o f  them is not explicitly limited to 
bodily processes. And  when Socrates produces a causal account of  the relation 
~7 With Di~s (see note  a5) I translate this word impersonally. 
~s Note  apergazontai, 4369; po/ous/n, 43c5 . 
~9 Cf. 42d 9 -  l o: "What  about  when,  in the case o f  the body, none  o f  these [processes] is taking 
place?" 
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between processes and pleasures and pains, to replace the discredited 
identification-account, he does so in terms that seem deliberately chosen to 
apply to psychic processes as well as to bodily ones: "While great changes 
produce [poiousin] pains and pleasures in us, measured and small ones pro- 
duce neither of  them at all" (43c4-6). Instead of  identifying those changes 
that produce pleasure or pain with those that are not "extinguished in the 
body before they reach the soul" (33d3-4), Socrates identifies them in purely 
quantitative terms. Such an account, though vague, has the virtue of  being 
general enough to apply to cases of  both bodily and psychic restoration. Later 
on in the dialogue (52a), Socrates explicitly discusses psychic changes (empty- 
ings) that go unnoticed and therefore produce no pain, and contrasts them 
with other psychic changes (replenishments) that are large enough to produce 
pleasure (51e-5~b). We may therefore safely summarize the account of  plea- 
sure that emerges from the above passage thus: the destruction or restoration 
of  the natural harmony of body or soul, when it is of  sufficient magnitude, 
produces pain or pleasure. Furthermore, taking the analysis of  perception as 
our guide, we may assume that the pleasure or pain is itself a psychic process 
(a "shock"); unlike perception, however, it can be caused either by a bodily 
process or by another psychic process. 
This revision of  the general account of  (nonreflective) pleasure is the most 
complete of  the three statements of  that account in the Philebus. The two other 
statements, the preliminary one at the beginning of  the discussion of  pleasure 
and a passage that remains to be considered, both involve certain simplificati- 
ons. We have already seen how the preliminary account masks a certain vague- 
ness by falsely identifying pleasure with the process of  restoration, a simplifica- 
tion rendered necessary by the early stage of  the discussion and Protarchus' 
relative lack of  sophistication. As we shall now see, the final account of  the 
general nature of  (nonreflective) pleasure employs a similar simplification, 
although for different reasons, and without committing itself to any false 
assertions. 
After completing his analysis of  the various kinds of  pure and impure 
pleasures, and before turning to an analysis of  the kinds of  knowledge, Socra- 
tes treats once more of  pleasure in general. His purpose is to make the point 
that the nature of  pleasure as such disqualifies it from admission to the "class 
of  the good" (tOi tou agathou moirai; 54ClO). ~~ Instead of referring to the ac- 
count of  pleasure he and Protarchus have developed in the course of  their 
discussion, Socrates invokes the views of others: 
,o It is clear that Socrates is not arguing that there is no sense in which any pleasure can be 
good; rather,  his claim is only that neither pleasure in general, nor any particular pleasure, can, 
on metaphysical grounds, be the highest good. 
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Haven't we heard about pleasure that it is always a coming-into-being [genesis], but has 
no being [ous/a] at all? For certain subtle persons, you know, are trying to make this 
position clear to us, and we must be grateful to them. (53c4-7) 
Socrates goes on  to a rgue  that  all coming- into-being comes to be for  the sake 
o f  being,  and  that  while that  for  the sake o f  which someth ing  comes  to be 
belongs to the class o f  the good,  things that  come to be for  the sake o f  o the r  
things do not. I f  p leasure  is a coming-into-being,  then,  it does not be long  to 
the class o f  the good  (54cl-d2).  
T h e  not ion that  p leasure  is a coming- in to-being that  is for  the sake o f  some 
being has an obvious resemblance  to the view that  p leasure  is a res torat ion o f  a 
na tura l  ha rmo ny .  This  resemblance  is especially s t rong if  we model  o u r  unde r -  
s tanding o f  the way one  thing is for  the sake o f  ano the r  on Pro tarchus '  exam-  
ple, that  o f  shipbuilding 's  be ing for  the sake o f  ships. On this model ,  the 
natura l  h a r m o n y  would co r re spond  to the ship, the res torat ion o f  it to the 
shipbuilding.  I f  we u n d e r s t a n d  Socrates '  a r g u m e n t  this way, the claim that  
p leasure  is a coming- in to-being  amoun t s  to a claim that  p leasure  is identical 
with a res tora t ion  to a na tura l  ha rmony ,  a claim that  we have seen Socrates 
m a k e  in his first discussion of  the general  na ture  of  pleasure  only to re t ract  in 
the second in favor  o f  the m o r e  nuanced  view that  such res torat ion causes 
pleasure.  Why does  Socrates ignore  that  m o r e  nuanced  view here? 
I t  should be  no ted  that  Socrates never  explicitly endorses  the view that  
p leasure  is a "coming- into-being"  in the way that  shipbuilding is. I t  is open  to 
h im to say that  he  has only p roved  that  those who accept such an identification 
are commi t t ed  to the view that  p leasure  is not  good as an end.  I f  Pro ta rchus  or 
an inat tent ive r eade r  has failed to r e m e m b e r  the modificat ion such a theory  o f  
p leasure  requires ,  this a r g u m e n t  should pe r suade  him o f  an impor t an t  t ruth.  
But  Plato is not  s imply having Socrates p resen t  a valid a r g u m e n t  with a t rue  
Conclusion and  a false premise.  For  he has Socrates int imate that  there  is a way 
o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  the relat ion between a coming- in to-being and  that  for  the 
sake o f  which it comes  to be that  is quite d i f ferent  f rom that  o f  Protarchus .  2~ 
T o  illustrate how one  thing can be for  the sake o f  another ,  Socrates uses the 
"Most scholars understand the distinction between genesis and 0us/a in the way suggested by 
Protarchus' example. (E.g., E. Friedrichs, Platons Lehre yon der Lust in Gorgias und Philebos [Halle, 
189o ], 48; Hackforth, Plato's Philebus, lO6; Gosling, Plato: Philebus, 125; R. Shiner, Knowledge and 
Reality in Plato's "Philebus" [Assen, 19741, 49-52; Di~s, Philkbe, lxvii-lxviii.) Benitez, Forms in Plato's 
"Philebus," lo3-1o 5, sees that "Protarchus is the one who brings up ships and shipbuilding, not 
Socrates," and comments: "This change of speaker may be significant, and ought to make us 
wonder whether the case of ships and shipbuilding is accepted by Socrates as .an example or 
analogy" 0o4). But Benitez does not see how Socrates' own example points the way to a proper 
understanding of this distinction as an ontological one. Scholars maintaining the ontological 
interpretation include Ferber, "Platos Polemik," 153 and Hampton, Pleasure, Knowledge, and Be- 
ing, 74. 
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relation of  lovers to their beloveds (53d9-1o). Now a lover does not produce 
his beloved, at least not in the way that shipbuilding produces ships. The 
beloved is an already existing thing, for the sake of  which the lover does that 
which characterizes him as a lover. If  the restoration (coming-into-being) of  a 
natural harmony is analogous to the activity of  a lover, then that for the sake 
of  which the restoration comes to be will not be its product, the natural 
harmony, but rather something else, already existing, that stands over and 
above both the process of  restoration and its product. On this account, neither 
the restoration, nor the natural harmony to which it leads, nor the pleasure 
that it incidentally produces if it is of  sufficient magnitude, would be in the 
class of  the good. The  theory that results from taking Socrates' example seri- 
ously has obvious connections with the doctrine of  eros in the Symposium and 
Phaedrus3 9 What is important for our purposes is that the argument Socrates 
uses to show that pleasure conceived as coming-into-being cannot be in the 
class of  the good does not depend on the identification of  pleasure and the 
restoration of  a natural harmony. Socrates's argument works even if pleasure 
is conceived as a coming-into-being or process produced in the soul by such a 
restoration. 
Our  investigation has shown, then, that the three statements of a general 
account of  pleasure, found at the beginning, middle, and end of  the long 
discussion of  pleasure in the Philebu.s, are mutually consistent. Pleasure, on this 
account, is a psychic process of  a special sort, caused by the restoration, when 
that restoration is a change of  sufficient magnitude, of  a natural harmony in 
either body or soul. As I remarked earlier, however, since this account is 
applicable only to pleasures caused by an actual restoration of  body or soul, it 
does not cover anticipatory or emotional pleasures. But of  these latter kinds of  
pleasure Plato does not give accounts that are unrelated to the restorative 
model. As we shall see, Socrates' treatment of  these pleasures suggests a modi- 
fication of  the account of  pleasure at which we have arrived, a modification 
that produces an account applicable to all kinds of  pleasure. 
3. PLEASURES OF ANTICIPATION 
Pleasure, according to the account we have presented so far, is a psychic 
process caused by a process, whether bodily or psychic, that is a restoration to 
harmony. The fact that pleasure is not identical to such restoration, but 
caused by it, leaves open the possibility that pleasure may be caused by some- 
thing that, though not itself a restoration, shares some of its causal properties. 
Pleasures of  anticipation and emotional pleasures are caused, I suggest, not by 
actual restorations, but by certain complex images which involve the mental 
2~ So too Frede,  "Dis in tegra t ion  and  Restorat ion,"  6 4 n i. 
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representation of  such restorations. More precisely, they are caused by images 
representing both the conditions of  such a restoration and the pleasure ensu- 
ing on such a restoration. 
To see how this complex image might itself produce pleasure, we need to 
consider more closely the nature of  the psychic process that pleasure is. The 
pleasure that is caused by a restoration is clearly a certain kind of  awareness; 
yet it is not an awareness of  that restoration, as such. To take one of  Socrates' 
.examples: the pain of being cold is caused by the solidification of one's inter- 
nal moisture, while the pleasure of  being warmed in such circumstances is 
caused by the dissolution of  these congelations (32a6-8). Yet the pleasure 
caused by such a restoration can scarcely involve an awareness that one's 
frozen internal moisture is melting; the doctor or natural philosopher is the 
one who has such knowledge, not the person feeling the pleasure. Indeed, it 
seems that this pleasure has no cognitive or propositional content at all. It may 
appropriately be called a mere feeling, so long as it is understood that not 
every restoration causes the same feeling: just as the causes are different, so 
are the feelings they produce.*3 
Now restorative pleasures can be caused by psychic as well as by bodily 
processes; an example of  the former sort is the pleasure of  learning, which 
Socrates describes in terms of  repletion (cf. 52a5-6), the same mode of  restor- 
ing natural harmony involved in such bodily pleasures as those of  eating and 
drinking. But a different sort of  psychic process may also produce pleasure: 
namely, the psychic process of  representing oneself as in conditions one thinks 
would be pleasant and as enjoying them. In the past, one's being pleased 
under such conditions was a product of  the restoration of  some bodily or 
psychic harmony; as the discussion above has shown, however, one is not 
explicitly aware of  the nature of  that restoration. Similarly, the cognition that 
produces a reflective pleasure does not have as part of  its content the actual 
bodily or  psychic restoration; its content is that of oneself in pleasant condi- 
tions and feeling pleasure. 
This suggestion will grow clearer as we consider the dialogue's treatment 
15 Frede, "Disintegration and Restoration," maintains that "Plato's definition of  pleasure as a 
perceived feeling of  res tora t ion. . ,  precludes the identification of pleasure with a simple indis- 
tinct feeling that merely accompanies these processes or results from them." She argues that on 
such a view, "it does not matter where the pleasure comes from (push-pin or poetry); all that 
m a t t e r s  is that we are pleased" (444). But surely Plato can maintain qualitative, even moral, 
distinctions among pleasures conceived as noncoguitive feelings. Furthermore, even "reflective" 
pleasures, caused by cognitions of certain sorts, are not, on my interpretation of the Philebus, 
cognitive. (In denying that  any pleasures in the Philebus are cognitive in the sense of having 
propositional content, I differ from most writers who have focussed on the discussion of false 
pleasures in the dialogue. In my view, nothing in the discussion of  false pleasures requires that 
such pleasures, as opposed to their causes, have propositional content.) 
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o f  the pleasures o f  anticipation. These  pleasures are impor tan t  in the larger  
scheme o f  the dialogue because they provide the e lement  o f  pleasure in the 
mixture  o f  pleasure and pain that is desire.~4 T o  unders tand  the cause o f  
pleasures o f  anticipation, then, we may look to Socrates' discussion o f  desire, 
and specifically thirst, concerning which Socrates and Protarchus have the 
following exchange:  
Soc.: I suppose we say, from time to time, that a person thirsts for something. 
Prot.: Of course. 
Soc.: Which means he is being emptied? 
Prot.: Yes. 
Soc.: Now is thirst a desire? 
Prot.: Yes, a desire for drink. 
Soc.: For drink, or for the replenishment of drink? 
Prot.: I guess for the replenishment. (34e9-35a2) 
In what follows Socrates and Protarchus  concern themselves with the thirsting 
person's  cognitive relation to replenishment ,  ignoring any relation such a 
person may have to drink. Nonetheless,  it would be a mistake to suppose that 
dr ink  is ment ioned  here  only to be discarded as a wrong  answer to the ques- 
tion o f  the object o f  thirst. Rather,  it reminds  us that to unders tand  thirst, we 
shall have to unde r s t and  not  only the cognitive relation o f  the thirsting person 
to replenishment ,  but  also how that relation is related to that person's obvious 
cognitive relat ion to drink. 
Socrates suggests that the thirsting person "grasps hold o f  rep len ishment  
t h rough  memory"  o f  past exper iences  o f  replenishment  (cf. 35bl  1-cQ. Such 
past exper iences  were experiences o f  drinking,  in which the dr inking person 
was aware, however,  not  o f  bodily replenishment  as such (i.e., o f  the rise in 
water-content  in various bodily organs), but  ra ther  o f  the pleasure that such 
rep len ishment  causes. Now the passage with which we are concerned  occurs 
before  Socrates explicitly makes the distinction between rep lenishment  and 
the pleasure that  it causes (at 43bl-c6);  Socrates and Protarchus still conceive 
o f  pleasure in such a way that the first can say, and the second agree, that "the 
force o f  mois ture  replenishing again what has been dr ied out  is pleasure" 
(31 e 10 -  32a 1). Looking at the discussion o f  thirst f rom the point  o f  view of  the 
,4 See 47c6-7: "Whenever a person is being emptied, he desires replenishment, and insofar as 
he anticipates this, he rejoices [elpizOn men chairet], but insofar as he is being emptied, he is in pain 
[kenoumenos de alger]." Most commentators suppose that 35e9-36cl shows that there is no anticipa- 
tory pleasure in cases where one despairs of attaining the object of one's desire. But such a view is 
mistaken, as the use ofpothos at 36a6 in connection with such a situation suggests. Pothos (yearn- 
ing) is itself a mixture of psychic pleasure and psychic pain (see 47e l, 5ob7). The very intensity of 
the pain of a despairing desire derives from the moment of pleasure contained in it. H.-G. 
Gadamer, Plato's DlalecticalEthics, tr. R. Wallace (New Haven, 1991), 160--61, is the only scholar I 
know who interprets along similar lines. 
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account of  pleasure as later revised, we can see that what the thirsting person 
"has hold of by memory" is not the bodily replenishment as such, but the 
pleasure that that replenishment caused.~5 Furthermore, the thirsting person 
typically has got cognitive hold of something more: namely, the conditions in 
the past that gave rise to this pleasure,~ 6 i.e., drinking. It would seem, then, 
that thirst typically involves a cognition that one's drinking would produce 
pleasure. The pleasure of anticipation is the pleasure that entertaining this 
cognition itself produces. 
The cognition that one's drinking would be pleasant, on this account, 
itself produces pleasure. The causal relation here is similar to that in play 
when the act of  drinking itself produces pleasure. In the latter case, the 
actual restoration of a bodily harmony produces a psychic motion that is 
pleasure; in the former, entertaining an image of (the conditions of) such a 
restoration (and the pleasure it produces) produces a similar psychic motion. 
In order  for the actual restoration to take place and produce pleasure, the 
natural harmony in question must have been disrupted; so too, it seems 
plausible to suggest, for the imagined restoration to produce pleasure, the 
natural harmony must have been disrupted (as is the case in the thirsting 
person), or the disruption of that harmony must itself be cognitively enter- 
tained.~7 In the former case, the imagined restoration produces a psychic 
effect similar to that of  an actual restoration. It might be thought that it does 
so merely through association; yet I suspect that Plato looks on the situation 
somewhat differently. The imagined restoration produces pleasure not sim- 
ply because it has been associated with such pleasure, but rather specifically 
because it is an image of  the restoration that would produce such pleasure. 
The image itself has the ability to fulfill the relevant lack, or restore the 
relevant harmony. Or rather, as an appearance of such restoration, the 
image can appear to fulfill the relevant lack, without, in fact, doing so. 
Hence the persistence of the pain of the disrupted harmony alongside the 
pleasure caused by the apparent restoration. Although Plato's emphasis on 
2~ In discussing anticipatory pleasure commentators often switch, without comment, from 
talking about replenishment  to talking about pleasure. Thus Voigtliinder, Die Lust und das Gut*, 
first says that dur ing thirst we remember  "den frt iheren Zustand der  Anfiillung" (132), and later 
says that  we remember  "des Angenehmen" (134). See also the quotation from Susemihl in note 8 
above. 
,s Presumably thirst does not essentially involve cognition of something that would relieve it; 
one might simply have the memory of pleasure without remembering what gave that pleasure to 
one. But any desire that is going to guide action requires cognition both of the pleasure that 
attends restoration and of conditions that would produce it. 
9 7 That  is to say: the imagined disruption of a natural harmony may provide the context that 
enables the imagining of restoration to produce pleasure. When we enjoy in prospect a good 
meal, we are either actually hungry, or imagine ourselves as being hungry when we eat it. 
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the role of  images in causing this sort of  pleasure may strike us as strange, a 
theory of  this sort has been attractive to a variety of  thinkers. Freud's theory 
of  dreams as wish-fulfillment, for example, is founded on the notion that 
psychic representations of  oneself obtaining what one needs can produce a 
pleasure like that produced by actually obtaining it. ~8 
Our  discussion of  the anticipatory pleasure involved in thirst, then, leads 
us to modify in the following way our formulation of  the account of  pleasure 
Plato offers in the Philebus. Pleasure is a conscious psychic process, a feeling, 
caused either by a bodily or psychic restoration to natural harmony, or by the 
cognition of  the conditions (and pleasant consequences) of  some such restora- 
tion in the past. This account is corroborated by its clear application to the 
complex example of  a pleasure of  anticipation that Socrates adduces in his 
discussion of  false pleasures: 
Soc.: A person often sees an unstinted amount of gold accruing to himself, along with 
many pleasures taken in that gold; and most of all he gazes on himself painted into the 
picture and intensely pleased with himself. (4oalo-l~) 
Socrates is referring to mental pictures (called variously eikones [39c4], z~graph~- 
mata [39d7], phantasmata ezOgraph~mena [4oa9]), the entertaining of  which is 
one way of  experiencing hope or expectation.29 There are two components 
to the picture he here describes: the individual's coming into great wealth, 
and that individual's feeling great pleasure. The individual is able to connect 
these two components because in the past the possession of  money has led 
(through restorations the precise nature of  which the individual need not 
have in mind) to pleasant feeling. The individual's hope consists in his enter- 
taining this composite picture of  himself enjoying a financial windfall in the 
future; the pleasure that this hope produces in him is the present pleasure of  
anticipation.3o 
,s Interestingly, Freud considers dreams prompted by the body's need for water to be the 
clearest illustration of his theory. Cf. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, tr. J. Strachey (New York, 
1965), 157: "If I can succeed in appeasing my thirst by dreaming that I am drinking, then I need 
not wake up in order to quench it" (emphasis in original). Freud also refers (158 n.) to Isaiah a 9:8: 
"It shall b e . . .  as when a thirsty man dreameth, and, behold, he drinketh." 
29 Socrates holds that the cognition involved in hoping need not be "illustrated," but can have 
as its intentional object a bare proposition; see 4oa6- 7. 
30 It is sometimes thought that Socrates, and Plato, confuse the image of the future pleasure 
and the present pleasure that entertaining that image causes (see Gosling and Taylor, The Greeks 
on Pleasure, 438). However, Socrates very plainly distinguishes between the two at 4~b8-c 3. Socra- 
tes' use of  various forms of h~don~ pseud~s to refer to the picture of a future pleasure in his 
discussion of the gold-example (4ob6-7, cl,  c4-5), while elsewhere using that expression for the 
present pleasure caused by entertaining such a picture (cf. 4oe 3, 9-1o), is to be explained in terms 
of the dialectical strategy Plato has Socrates employ to get Protarchus to acknowledge the exis- 
tence of  actual pleasures that it is meaningful to call false. 
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4" E M O T I O N A L  P L E A S U R E S :  MALICIOUS LAUGHTER 
AS we have  seen, the p leasure  o f  anticipation is caused, not  by a bodily process,  
but  by a psychic one. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  it differs f rom such psychic pleasures  as 
those o f  l ea rn ing  in be ing caused not  by the res torat ion o f  a na tura l  ha rmony ,  
but  by the cognit ion o f  onesel f  as enjoying condit ions that  would cause such a 
restorat ion.  Such cognit ion is reflective; hence I call the pleasures  they cause 
reflective, too. I shall a rgue  in this section that  the pleasures and  pains in- 
volved in emot iona l  exper ience  are  also reflective in the sense o f  be ing caused 
by a cognit ion o f  oneself.  T h e  reflective cognitions in these cases are,  however ,  
m o r e  complex  than  those involved in ant ic ipatory pleasure.  T h e r e f o r e  be fo re  
tu rn ing  to the pleasures  and  pains o f  malicious laughter ,  the example  o f  
emot ional  p leasure  and  pain  Socrates analyzes most  carefully in the Phileb~,  I 
shall t u rn  to a case o f  reflective pain  that  is o f  in te rmedia te  complexi ty,  and  
which Socrates and  Pro ta rchus  t reat  in passing. I r e fe r  to the pain caused by 
the realization that  one  has fo rgo t ten  someth ing  one  once knew. 
T h e  exchange  which Socrates and  Pro tarchus  have on this subject is as 
follows: 
Soc.: If, to people who are filled up with learning, there later occur losses through 
forgetfulness, do you observe any pains in these losses? 
Prot.: Not, at any rate, as a natural occurrence, but I do in certain calculations 
[/og/smo/s] about the experience, when the deprived person feels pain because of 
need.s~ 
Soc.: Well, dear man [6 makar/e], for now, at least, we are going through precisely 
the experiences of  nature alone, without calculation. (52a5-b3) 
Al though  Socrates is concerned  in this passage to show that  the pleasures  o f  
learn ing  need  not  be  accompan ied  by pain, his address ing  Pro tarchus  with 
the express ion  6 makar/e hints that  Plato means  us to take due  notice o f  what  
Pro ta rchus  says.s~ Pro ta rchus  concurs  with Socrates that  the loss o f  knowl- 
e d g e - w h i c h  we mus t  unde r s t and  as the d isrupt ion o f  a psychic h a r m o n y  
which is in some sense n a t u r a l - - d o e s  not  itself cause pain. However ,  some 
sort  o f  reflection on  that  loss does.ss T h e  scenario Pro tarchus  evidently has 
s'dia t~  chreian. Di~s, Waterfield, and Frede translate similarly. Hackforth and Gosling 
prefer a different translation ofchreia. Hackforth: "he feels pain because of the usefulness of what 
he has lost"; Gosling: "because of its value." These latter translations (especially Gosling's) do not 
indicate what provokes the reflection of the person who has forgotten, which however the syntax 
of the clause (cf. the aorist lupSth~) leads us to expect. 
n2J.V. Luce remarks that the vocative makar/e is "a form of address often used by Socrates in 
passages of 'pith and moment' " ("A Discussion of Phaedo 69a6-c2," Classical Quarterly 38 [1944]: 
6o-64, 6o), adducing, besides the Phaed0 passage he discusses, Protagoras 313e5, Charmides 157a3, 
and the discovery of the definition of justice at Republic 432d7. 
s3 Protarchus' assertion that the pain in question is dependent on calculation and Socrates' 
apparent agreement show the similarity between this sort of pain and the pleasures of anticipa- 
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in mind  is one  in which one  finds oneself  in circumstances where the knowl- 
edge  one  once had would be useful. It is only then that one realizes that one  
has lost that knowledge. Such a realization involves, I suggest, at least two 
self-representations:  on the one  hand,  one  pictures oneself  as one  was in the 
past, in full possession o f  the knowledge one  current ly  needs; on the other ,  
one  pictures onesel f  as current ly  lacking that knowledge. Enter ta ining the 
f o r m e r  self-representat ion,  that is, the representa t ion o f  oneself  with the 
resources needed  to res tore  some natural  harmony,  causes (reflective) plea- 
sure; enter ta in ing the latter, a representa t ion o f  oneself  without those re- 
sources, causes (reflective) pain.34 What  is impor tan t  for  o u r  purposes  is that 
this reflective pain is caused by a self-representat ion which gets its content  in 
par t  f rom the contrast  with the self-representation o f  oneself  as one  once 
was. It  is the contrast  between one's present  lot and one's f o rmer  possession 
o f  knowledge that  gives rise to the peculiar pain to which Protarchus  and 
Socrates he re  refer .  
This  account  o f  the pain caused by reflection on one's having forgot ten  
something can help explain both the pain o f  malice and the pleasure o f  mali- 
cious laughter .  Jus t  as the pain concerning forgot ten knowledge is caused by 
enter ta in ing  an image or  representa t ion  o f  oneself  that gets its content  in par t  
f rom a compar ison  with an image o f  oneself  as one used to be, so in the case o f  
malice the pain and pleasure are caused by enter ta ining images o f  oneself  that 
get their  content  in par t  f rom a comparison with others  (or with images o f  
others).  T h e  person who suffers f rom phthonos feels pain because he has an 
image o f  himself  as, in compar ison to o ther  people,  lacking certain good 
things (that is, things the possession o f  which, he thinks, would enable him, via 
the res torat ion o f  various natural  harmonies,  to feel pleasure). T h e  spectacle 
o f  o the r  people  possessing such goods as knowledge, virtue, good looks, and 
wealth makes the envious person represen t  himself  to himself  as lacking in 
those goods, which representa t ion causes him pain.~s 
T h e  pleasure that  the malicious person feels at the misfortunes o f  his 
fr iends,  and the laughter  that issues f rom this mixture  o f  pleasure and pain, 
are caused by a similar, t hough  still more  complicated, comparison between 
tion, which Socrates had earlier asserted to be impossible without calculation: "One who is de- 
prived of calculation [/0g/sm0u] must be unable to calculate that at a later time he will rejoice" 
(21c5-6). 
The experience as a whole, therefore, is a mixture of pleasure and pain, in which the pain 
predominates. 
s5 Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, suggests that it is not the lack of these specific goods that 
the malicious person feels, but rather his being at a competitive disadvantage in a more abstract 
sense: "[I]t is essential to ill will that one is not concerned with the thing that one begrudges the 
other person, as s u c h . . .  ; instead, one is concerned that the other person should not get ahead of 
one or catch up with one by such a success" (185). 
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the malicious person himself and the object of  his laughter. Socrates describes 
the laughable (to geloion) as the vice of  self-ignorance, when found in weak or 
harmless persons. Such self-ignorance involves supposing one possesses good 
things that one does not. To perceive someone as laughable, Socrates says, is 
to perceive, among other things, that that person is not in a position to harm 
one (49b6-c5); such perception therefore involves at least a minimal compari- 
son, in respect of  power or social status, between that person and oneself. But 
it also involves, I suggest, a more extensive comparison. In entertaining the 
spectacle of  someone who thinks he has some good that he in fact does not, the 
malicious person forms, in contrast, a favorable image of  himself, which 
causes him pleasure.~ 6 This image cannot simply be the image of  himself as 
possessing the good that the other does not have; such an image, though 
doubtless (on the account I ascribe to Plato) a source of  pleasure, would 
depend on a contrast merely with the other as not having the good in ques- 
tion, not as imagining himself to possess it. The pleasure distinctive of  mali- 
cious laughter is a pleasure that results from seeing that the other is self- 
deluded about the goods he has; the self-image that viewing another in this 
light evokes by contrast in the malicious person is the image of oneself as not 
self-deluded about one's own good attributes. Seeing oneself as possessing 
self-knowledge (a self-perception produced through contrast with a ridicu- 
lously self-deluded person) is the cause of  malicious pleasure. Because the 
malicious person also suffers pain from viewing himself, in general, as lacking 
goods other persons possess, his malicious pleasure is sharpened by contrast 
with pain, and issues in laughter. 
Two more points remain to be made about this account of  malicious plea- 
sure and pain. First of  all, it implies that the malicious person himself lacks 
self-knowledge; for if that person in fact knew what goods he possessed, he 
would not allow his self-image to be influenced by a comparison with others.~7 
Secondly, this account makes clear why Socrates thinks that it makes no differ- 
ence whether the persons who help cause the malicious person's pleasure and 
pain are actual persons with whom he has dealings, or merely artistic represen- 
tations on stage.38 The pleasure and pain of  malice are immediately caused by 
entertaining a certain image of  oneself; other persons contribute to the experi- 
ence only in that one's cognition of  their situation serves to modify one's self- 
36 Compare the similar account of Hobbes, Essay on Human Nature (in English Works, ed. W. 
Molesworth [London, 1839-x845l, IV 46): "The passion of laughter is nothing else but  sudden 
glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the 
infirmity of others, or with our  own infirmity" (emphases in original). 
57 The  malicious person is, therefore, so long as he is harmless, himself ridiculous. 
38 Cf. 49c3-4: self-ignorance in strong people is harmful, "both itself, and as many things as 
are images of it" (aut~ te kai hosai eikones autos eisin); also 5obx-4 . 
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image by contrast. An artistic image of  persons in the relevant conditions may 
serve as the distorting backdrop to our own self-image just as well as actual 
persons in such conditions. 
The above account of  malicious pleasures and pains goes far beyond what 
is explicitly given in the Philebus, though it does, I hope, build plausibly on 
suggestions in that dialogue. (As in some other late dialogues,39 in the Philebus 
simpler cases are treated first and with great fullness, while more complex 
cases are treated towards the end of  the dialogue with a concision that chal- 
lenges the reader to work out the details.) Socrates' and Protarchus' remarks 
on the pain consequent on realizing one has forgotten something suggest how 
one's self-image can be modified by contrast with another; and while in the 
discussion ofphthonos no mention is made of  the malicious person's comparing 
himself with others, that account implies, as we have seen, at least a minimal 
comparison of  this sort. The nature of  the phenomenon itself suggests that a 
more extensive comparison is involved. Moreover, the interpretation of  
Plato's analysis of  malicious pleasure we have proposed above may derive 
corroboration of  a sort from a passage in Plutarch which presents an analysis 
of  another of  the emotional conditions Socrates mentions in the dialogue, z~los 
or zealous emulation. Although Plutarch's Platonic sympathies are well 
known,4o we are scarcely in a position confidently to assert that he drew his 
analysis of  z~los from a Platonic source. Nonetheless, his analysis shows striking 
parallels with the account of  phthonos given above, and to that extent at least 
suggests that that account is Platonic in spirit. The parallels consist in Plu- 
tarch's view that zealous emulation is a mixture of  pleasure and pain, each of  
which is caused by a comparison the person in this condition makes between 
himself and the object of  his emulation. Such a person, Plutarch writes, "com- 
pares himself with the acts and deeds of  a good and perfect man, at the same 
time gnawed by the awareness of  his deficiency [t~i suneidoti tou endeous 
claknomenos] and rejoicing because of  his expectation and yearning [di' elpida 
kai pothon chair~n] . . ." (De Profectibus in Virtute 84c-d).41 
5.  C O N C L U S I O N  
In this essay I have argued that a single generic account of  pleasure underlies 
Plato's discussion of  pleasure in the Philebus. Plato's discussion includes three 
explicit treatments of  pleasure as such, which are found at the beginning, 
39 The Theaetetus is a good example of such a dialogue. 
40 Cf. R. Flaceli~re and J. Irigoin, Plutarque. Oeuvres morales, I, Premiere partie (Paris, 1987), 
cxxiv: "P lu ta rque . . .  a toujours maintenu fermement sa pens~e dans l'axe de Platon, sansjamais 
perdre le cap." 
41 This passage is quoted by E. Milobenski, Dos Neid in der griechischen Philosophie (Wiesbaden, 
1964), 5 ~ n. 98. 
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middle and end of  the section on pleasure. These three treatments, though 
differing superficially for reasons I have suggested, essentially agree on an 
analysis of  pleasure as a conscious psychic process caused by a restoration of  a 
natural harmony in either body or soul. This analysis does not directly apply 
to two important kinds of  pleasure treated in the dialogue, namely, anticipa- 
tory and emotional pleasure. But Plato's discussion of  these kinds of  pleasure, 
far from showing that there can be no single overarching account of  pleasure, 
suggests how the theory present in the three explicit treatments of  generic 
pleasure may be modified so as to cover these apparently anomalous cases. 
Anticipatory and emotional pleasures, Socrates suggests, are brought about by 
one's entertaining a certain image of  oneself; for this reason such pleasures 
can be termed "reflective." The general account of  pleasure that would apply 
to both reflective and nonreflective pleasures, then, reads as follows: Pleasure 
is a conscious psychic process caused either by a restoration of  a natural 
harmony in body or soul, or by entertaining a representation of  oneself as in 
the conditions that cause such restorative pleasure. To put it more briefly and 
only slightly misleadingly: pleasure may be caused by the image as well as by 
the reality of  bodily or psychic restoration. 
Plato nowhere in the Philebus has any of  his characters enunciate the gen- 
eral account of  pleasure which I have argued emerges from the dialogue. This 
omission is due to the nature of  Plato's manner of  presenting his philosophical 
views: namely, in such a way that the reader is provoked to pursue certain 
lines of  inquiry herself, following up indications in the dialogue as to how that 
inquiry might profitably proceed. This style of  philosophical writing is recog- 
nized by many to be that of  the earlier dialogues of  Plato; I am convinced that 
it is the style of  at least some of the later dialogues as well. Looking at the 
Philebus in this way will allow us to understand the philosophical content of  
this most underappreciated of  Platonic dialogues, and the artfulness with 
which it is communicated. I hope the present essay has made a first contribu- 
tion towards this goal.~ 9 
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